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This thesis uses event study methodology to assess the effectiveness of 
information control by the government. We use the information censorship by the 
Chinese government during the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratoiy Syndrome) period 
as the event to examine the responses of the Mainland China stock market. Negative 
impacts of SARS have already been captured in the stock market by the SARS 
sensitive industries, such as retailing and tourism, during the period under 
governmental control on SARS information. The stock market is driven by non-
governmental SARS information rather than the official information provided by the 
Chinese government. Evidence suggests that information control by the government 
is ineffective. To handle shocks, it is recommended that the government should 
provide accurate, timely and transparent information to but not hide and block 
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Catastrophes and crises, either natural hazards or man-made crises, can be 
disastrous. Economic shocks are inevitable and political quakes may even happen if 
the crises cannot be restored. Benson and Clay (2004) examines the financial and 
economic impacts of natural disasters. They have found that natural disasters cause 
significant budgetary pressures, with both narrowly short-term fiscal impacts and 
wider long-term implications for development.' The impacts of man-made crises can 
be enormous and long lasting, too. Examples include financial crises in Mexico 
(1994), Asia (1997) and Argentina (2001). Affected economies enter into years of 
recession. Governments face serious socio-economic problems such as severe 
unemployment, risk of exchange rate system, declining exports and increasing 
external debts.^ 
Negative economic consequences might lead to severe political aftershocks. 
Citizens tend to be disoriented and erroneously search explanations for their 
sufferings. Social disorders such as protests and strikes are commonly found. For 
instance, suffered from the economic collapse caused by the Asian Financial Crisis, 
Indonesia's ethnic Malays blamed on Indonesians of Chinese descent and killed their 
‘See "Understanding the economic and financial impacts of natural disasters" published by the World 
Bank at http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC 172 lO.htm 
2 See an electronic economic textbook "Financial Crisis in East Asia" at 
http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/etextbook/4534/4534 1 4.pdf 
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Chinese compatriots; because of Pakistani government's failure to respond to a 
devastating typhoon in 1970，a civil war broke out between eastern and western 
Pakistan. If the sentiment goes up to the extreme, political leadership will be shaken. 
In 1954, following a devastating hurricane, the Haitian government's outright theft of 
international relief aid was so blatant that the president was eventually driven from 
office. Nicaragua earthquake (1972) fueled the growth of an opposition movement 
which eventually overthrew the government.^ It is evident that the negative impacts 
of shocks are potentially high economically and politically. 
Government officials do not welcome shocks because of their dangerous 
nature. As a result, they will devote whatever efforts to contain shocks and restore 
stability. If real shocks come, remedial measures such as assistances to crises' victims 
and subsidies to affected industries are usually used to lessen the sufferings of citizens. 
Sometimes, the shocks are so devastating that reconstructions of the economy are 
required. There exist many literatures addressing the economics of different 
catastrophes, including the impacts, risk assessment and risk management. 
(Kunreuther and Rose, 2004/ 
Another type of measures used by the government is of a pre-shock nature. 
When the government discovers some potential shocks which are not recognized by 
3 Citations come from http://www.countrvrisk.com/editorials/achieves/000299.htm 
4 The authors collected fifty-two previously published papers which address the economics of natural 
disasters. 
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the citizens yet, it is rational for the government leaders to prevent them from 
realization. "Information censorship" or hiding crises' information is a tactic used to 
lengthen the time that can be used by the government to secretly settle the potential 
crises. It is hoped that the citizens will be fooled, potential shocks will not be 
recognized, panics will not happen and thus the negative impacts to the economy can 
be minimized. 
The effectiveness of pre-shock information control is the interest of this thesis. 
It is very hard to do researches on this issue since political information control is 
usually regarded as top secret. The public seldom knows what the government 
controls; even if the citizens know, there are hardly any reports on it which makes the 
investigation difficult. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), however, 
provides a golden chance to study this topic. 
SARS is an atypical pneumonia caused by a newly identified strain of corona 
virus. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), SARS is a highly 
infectious disease which is originated in Mainland China in November, 2002 and 
spread globally to more than 30 regions. The cumulative number of patients are more 
than 8,000 and 813 patients are put in death.^ Economic losses are huge, GDP of 
seriously affected regions record a double-digit percentage decrease when compared 
5 See "Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS" by World Health Organization from 
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/countrv/2003 07 11/en/. 
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to the same period in the previous year. The unknown nature of the disease and the 
potentially spoiling consequences raise the level of uncertainty in those SARS 
affected regions. As a result, containing the epidemic becomes the top mission of the 
governments. 
In facing the risk of SARS, the measures adopted by the Chinese government 
are notable. "Stability is of overriding importance" said by Deng Xiaoping, former 
leader of the Chinese government, shows clearly that the major principle of the 
Chinese government is to maintain stability.^ His successors Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao put forward his ideology. To maintain stability during the SARS period, the 
Chinese government has been holding information from the public regarding the 
outbreak of SARS. Many evidences can be found to prove the existence of 
information censorship by the Chinese government, for instance, the letter written by 
Doctor Jiang Yanyong which is posted in the Time Magazine and the investigation 
report of WHO experts on April 16，2003 7 
This thesis tries to investigate the effectiveness of governmental information 
control. However, whether it is effective or not is difficult to measure quantitatively. 
We need to assure the measurements are accurate by using a comprehensive tool 
6 Adapted from "The overriding need is for stability" (February 26, 1989) in "Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992)". 
7 See "Beijing's SARS Attack" at httD://www.time.com/time/asia/news/dailv/0.9754.441615,00.html 
and "SARS: Chronology of a serial killer" at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 04/en/index.html. 
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which is able to pick up SARS effects immediately. This can be done by utilizing the 
"stock market" since it is widely believed that stock market is efficient and sensitive. 
It is capable of capturing the effects of all information available in the economy at 
once. Consequently, we employ event study methodology to do our analyses. 
Event study is a standard methodology used to study the reaction of stock 
prices to public announcement. We pick SARS incident in Mainland China as the 
"event" and study the stock market reaction during the SARS period. The date "April 
20，2003" is a remarkable benchmark for studying the SARS event in Mainland China 
since the Chinese government admitted the previous SARS figures were 
underreported and promised to provide accurate and up to date information related to 
SARS afterwards. We first hypothesize that the information control by the Chinese 
government is ineffective and the impacts of SARS should be reflected in the stock 
market prior to the benchmark date of April 20, 2003. The empirical findings show 
that the impacts of SARS on the SARS sensitive industries have already been 
captured before the official announcement day. 
Secondly, we try to test whether the stock market follows the official 
announcement when there is conflicting information. Just before the official 
announcement day, the SARS news was contradictory between the Chinese 
government on one side and the non-govemmental parties including international 
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press, WHO and the informed Chinese insiders on another side. The former claimed 
that the SARS situation was under control while the latter believed that the real 
circumstances were much serious than what the government claimed. Empirical 
findings reveal that SARS sensitive industries react according to the non-
governmental news which supports our conjecture of ineffective information control 
by the government. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study testing the 
effectiveness of information control by the government. Although we cannot claim 
whether the information control by the Chinese government has minimized or 
intensified the negative impacts of SARS since a perfect virtual control is hardly to 
find, this thesis can conclude that the information control by the Chinese government 
is ineffective. The reasons are that the negative effects of SARS have been captured 
in the pre-announcement period and the stock market reaction of SARS sensitive 
industries does not synchronize with the official SARS announcements. 
Communications are very efficient in the modem world. With a sound telephonic and 
internet network, obtaining information is not as expensive as previous time. 
Therefore, using information control to handle shocks might not be effective and it is 
questionable to continue using it. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the 
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background of SARS and the evolution of SARS in Mainland China. Section 3 
introduces the methodology of event study. Section 4 describes the data used. 
Section 5 sets up our hypotheses and empirically test whether the information control 
by the Chinese government is effective. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
In this section, we first describe the background of SARS which includes the 
nature and impacts of the disease. Economic literatures of SARS are summarized. 
Finally, the evolution of SARS in Mainland China will be introduced. 
2.1 Nature of SARS 
The full name of SARS is "Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome". It is an 
atypical pneumonia finally proved to be caused by a newly identified strain of corona 
virus. The disease has originated in Mainland China in November, 2002, and it lasted 
for nearly eight months until the termination of SARS announcement made by the 
WHO.8 At the early stage of SARS period, it was a disease of unknown etiology in 
which no successful treatment was found. The most alarming feature of the disease is 
that it is highly infectious where it can spread through close human contact. Because 
of the easy infection nature of this fatal disease, SARS has made many citizens in the 
affected regions running scared. 
According to the World Health Organization, most patients identified have 
been previously healthy adults with only a few suspected cases among children. The 
8 See "SARS: Chronology of a serial killer" at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 04/en/index.html. 
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incubation period is usually 2 to 7 days in which patients have symptoms of high 
fever, sometimes accompanied by chills, headache, malaise and myalgias. At the 
onset of illness, low respiratory symptoms like dry cough and dyspnea appear and that 
may be progress to hypoxemia. In 10 to 20 percent of cases, the illness is too severe 
that intubation and mechanical ventilation are required. Although steroids and a 
variety of antibiotic and antiviral agents have been administered, there is no 
recognized and effective treatment. To the worst case, patients die because of 
respiratory problems. The fatality rate among the probable and suspected cases is 
around 3 percent.^ 
2.2 Impacts of SARS 
SARS has brought substantial impacts on the economy of affected regions. 
The impacts do not lie only on the medical sense but many other aspects. The 
following paragraphs summarize the impacts of SARS. 
2.2.1 Human Losses 
Because of the highly contagious nature of SARS, it had spread to 29 
countries and three regions. Infection areas mainly located in Asia with the most 
9 The clinical description of SARS is summarized from a WHO article, "Preliminary Clinical 
Description of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome" at http://\vww.who.int/csr/sars?clinical/en/. 
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severe cases in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Appendix 1 is a 
table which summarizes the cumulative number of reported cases of SARS by the 
WHO. From the beginning of SARS in November 2002 to 11 July 2003，there were 
8,437 cases of SARS happened worldwide, in which 7,865 happened in Asia. Since 
SARS was a new disease during that time, existing medication of pneumonia was not 
able to cure the disease effectively. Despite the hard work made by the medical 
experts, this fatal disease cost 813 people's lives. Even for those patients who 
survived from the syndrome, their health was seriously damaged and thus long period 
of rehabilitation is required. 
2.2.2 Psychological Shocks 
SARS did not merely affect patients physically. It had brought psychological 
shocks to the public. Since the virus is highly infectious and can be fatal, many 
rumours emerged and resulted in panics for the severely SARS affected regions. At 
that time, the exact mechanisms of transmission were still in doubt, but the virus 
seemed to be spread by intimate contact through transmission of droplets. Quick and 
effective isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of those who have been in 
close contact with them are the key measures for limiting the spread of the disease. 
However, inabilities to identify SARS patients, which may be under their incubation 
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period, made residents refuse to have social contacts with others. To avoid infection, 
the public preferred to stay at home and they were reluctant to go to crowded places. 
Even when they did, wearing face masks was unavoidable. People concerned more in 
the aspects of hygiene and individual health care. SARS, undoubtedly, led the public 
to have a deep thought and to modify their ordinary mode of living. 
2.2.3 Economic Losses 
To wind up an account of the damages caused by SARS, one cannot miss its 
economic impacts. Siu and Wong (2003)，Fan (2003) and Lee and McKibbin (2003) 
study the economic impacts of SARS and conclude that the most negative effects are 
on the demand side. This demand shock affected the economy through different 
channels and brought severe damages economically. 
First, a decline in local consumer spending. The fast speed of SARS 
contagion made people avoid social interactions. Consequently, people refrained 
from many consumption activities outside their homes. This adverse demand shock 
became substantial in the regions with large proportion of services sector and high 
population density, such as Hong Kong and Beijing. 
Second, a reduction in foreign investment. Lee and McKibbin (2003) claim 
that "uncertain features of the disease reduce confidence in the future of the affected 
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economy, and the loss of foreign investors' confidence would have potentially 
tremendous impacts on foreign investment flows." During the SARS period, many 
exhibitions were cancelled and potential investors were forced to hesitate their 
investments. This in turn brought significant impacts on economic growth. 
Third, a slump on the exports of services. The urgency and seriousness of 
SARS infection can be shown apparently by the panicky measures of the WHO. The 
WHO issued its first global alert because of SARS. Furthermore, it issued emergency 
travel warnings to the international travelers, recommending them to postpone all but 
essential travel to several SARS infection areas.'® According to an article issued by 
the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, "SARS has dealt a crushing blow to 
many sectors. Tourism, transportation, entertainment, restaurant, exhibition and other 
services sectors are directly affected, with tourism being the worst hit."" Kester 
(2004) also claims that SARS has significant negative impacts on the tourism industry 
in the Asia-Pacific countries. Taking Hong Kong as an example, the total number of 
visitor arrivals fell by 63 percent (around 850,000) between March and April 2003 
and the occupancy rate in Hong Kong hotels dropped dramatically from around 79 
percent in early March, 2003 to 18 percent in early May, 2003.'^ All these are evident 
See "Chronology of travel recommendations, areas with local transmission" on the WHO homepage 
at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 01/en/index.html. 
“ S e e "Impacts of SARS on Chinese Economy" on the Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
homepage at http://\wyw.tdctrade.com/alert/cba-e0306sp-4.htm. 
12 The data is obtained from Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2003d). 
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to show the shrinkage in the export sector of services. 
SARS increased the difficulty of business owners, especially those engaged in 
the services sectors including catering, retailing, hotels, tourism and airlines. The 
combined effects of the drop in domestic consumption and the decrease in tourist 
spending reduced the revenue earned by the entrepreneurs. At the same time, in order 
to make consumers feel comfortable in their shops, a hygienic environment was 
highly emphasized and thus disease prevention measures were unavoidable. These 
measures surely increased the cost in running business. To cope with such a difficult 
business environment, many companies either laid off workers or undertook work-
sharing schemes to lower operating costs, and, offer discounts to entice consumers to 
spend. All these attempts worsened the unemployment and deflation problems. 
2.3 Literature of SARS 
As we have discussed in the previous sections, impacts of SARS are alarming. 
It costs human lives, brings panics, alerts style of living, chokes off growth and finally 
causes social instability. Scientists, psychologists, sociologists and politicians have 
interests in studying SARS, economists are not the exception. 
Most of the existing economic literature studying SARS focuses on its 
economic impacts. Their findings are quite consistent, with the conclusions that 
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SARS impacts are not long term and the effects are of regional and sectoral. 
Firstly, SARS only significantly affect several but not all infection regions. 
Nippani and Washer (2004) examine the impact of SARS on the stock markets of 
Canada, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam using conventional /-test and the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test. It is concluded that only Mainland China and Vietnam are negatively 
impacted. Koo and Fu (2003) also study the impact of SARS and conclude that the 
negative effect is only seen clearly in cities such as Hong Kong and Beijing. Lee and 
McKibbin (2003) use G-cubed Model to estimate the economic effects of the SARS 
disease. They find that the estimated impact of SARS is large only on Mainland 
China and Hong Kong mainly because of the fixed exchange regimes in the two 
regions. Min (2005) and Siu and Wong (2003) claim that SARS is a negative shock to 
Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively. To sum up, SARS affects the Chinese 
economies, including the Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, the most. 
Secondly, SARS primarily affects services related industries such as tourism, 
retailing and catering. Using the seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average 
(SARIMA) model, Min (2005) measures the impact of SARS on Taiwan's inbound 
demand during and immediately following the outbreak. The empirical results 
indicate that Taiwan's international tourism industry is hard hit by the disease. By 
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looking at the figures released by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 
Siu and Wong (2003) find that the export of services related to tourism, air travel and 
hotels are severely affected. Zhang et al. (2003) study impact of SARS on the 
Chinese Stock Market via an event-study analysis. They find that only pharmaceutics 
and tourism industries are significantly impacted. 
Lastly, SARS impact is not long-lasting. When considering the SARS 
sensitive sectors, Min (2005), Siu and Wong (2003), Fan (2003)，Zhang et al. (2003) 
and Wu (2003) find out the SARS impacts is short term and transitory. Fear and panic 
subside quickly once the outbreak was under control, and the economy rebound 
rapidly. When looking at the whole economy, Nippani and Washer (2004) conclude 
that SARS has no significant negative impact on the affected countries. Koo and Fu 
(2003) also claim that the overall influence of SARS is limited and temporary since 
SARS is just one of the many risk factors faced by the East Asian economies. 
With the major trend of examining the economic impacts of SARS, studying 
other issues of SARS is limited. Only one published paper by Liu et al. (2005) use 
the occasion of SARS to investigate the response of the Taiwan citizens to an 
unexpected disease. The authors conduct two surveys in Taiwan during the spring 
2003 SARS epidemic and use contingent valuation methods to estimate Taiwanese's 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a vaccine to reduce the risk of infection and death from 
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an unexpected disease. They find that the Taiwanese show a high degree of concern 
about the threat posed by SARS and the estimated WTP is higher than the previous 
estimates. 
In this thesis, economic impact of SARS is not our main concern. However, 
we are going to use the timing of economic impact of SARS as a tool, to explore the 
effectiveness of information control by the Chinese government during the SARS 
period. 
2.4 Evolution of SARS in Mainland China 
Appendix 2 summarizes the evolution of SARS outbreak in Mainland China. 
SARS has been originated in Heyuan, Foshan City, Guangdong Province, Mainland 
China on November 16, 2002, but it is not identified much later. It started as a city-
level disease and gradually approached to provincial level and eventually grew into a 
national level threat. Within 3 months after the emergence of SARS, it had spread to 
Zhongshan City in January 2003, and then spread to Guangzhou and other counties in 
Guangdong Province in February 2003. By February 9，2003，Guangdong Province 
had a total of 305 cases and five deaths of SARS. Since the epidemic was not 
controlled probably, it spread to Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Beijing, and then 
sprawled to other provinces; with 24 out of 31 provinces and municipalities were 
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under the attack of SARS.'^ On April 20，2003, the Chinese government admitted the 
seriousness of SARS epidemic and launched a national battle in containing SARS. A 
lot of measures had been undertaken to suppress the epidemic, including daily 
broadcast of SARS information and preventive methods, immediate quarantines of 
suspected SARS patients, closure of schools and shortening of International Labour 
Holiday. Efforts devoted were proved to be successful quickly, outbreaks at the 
remaining sites showed signs of being under control in mid-May. The number of 
newly infected patients dropped speedily in late May and travel recommendations for 
different provinces were removed sequentially. On June 24’ 2003, with the removal 
of travel recommendations for Beijing, which is the last remaining area subject to 
WHO travel advice, Mainland China won the victory on the SARS battle and marked 
the end of SARS. 
See "Asia: How big a dent in the Economy? China counts the cost of SARS", Economist, 17 May 
2003 
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3. Event Study Methodology 
In this thesis, event study methodology is employed to investigate if the 
information control by the Chinese government during the SARS period in 2003 is 
effective in preventing SARS impacts on the economy. In this section, the method of 
event study is introduced which is largely based on the literature of MacKinlay (1997) 
and Skrepnek and Lawson (2001). 
Event studies are frequently employed in economics, accounting and financial 
researches to determine the economic impact of an event on the stock prices of firms. 
The wide applications of event studies are evident from its use in diverse branches of 
researches, which include measuring impacts of mergers and acquisitions, financing 
decisions, corporate expenditure decisions, regulatory changes, and earning 
announcements on the value of the firm. 
Event studies have a long history. Perhaps the first published paper is Dolley 
(1933). In his work, he examines the price effects of stock splits using a sample of 95 
splits from 1921 to 1931. Over the decades from the early 1930s until the late 1960s 
the level of sophistication of event studies improved and eventually resulted in the 
landmark studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969)，which serve as the 
basis for modem event study methodology. Ball and Brown (1968) consider the stock 
market responses to company earnings reports while Fama et al. (1969) study the 
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effects of stock splits after removing the effects of simultaneous dividend increases. 
In the years since these pioneering studies, a number of modifications have 
been developed. The most remarkable papers, which deal with the practical 
importance of many of the complications and adjustments, are Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985). The 1980 paper considers implementation issues for data sampled at a 
monthly interval and the 1985 paper deals with issues for daily data. These papers 
have raised the robustness of statistical tests in event study methodology. 
To conduct an event study, some procedures are required. The initial task of 
conducting an event study is to define the event of interest and identify the event 
window. In this thesis, the event chosen is the SARS information available in the 
epidemic period. We are interested in examining whether the information control by 
the government is effective in the SARS event. Event windows are difficult to 
identify in examining SARS events since SARS lasted for several months in Mainland 
China and the information was sequentially released with different contents 
throughout the whole period. As a result, we first utilize the four SARS sub-periods, 
which will be defined in section 5.2.1，as our long-event windows. The criterion of 
choosing long-event windows bases on the informational nature of the SARS news. 
The objective is to examine whether the stock market is able to capture SARS effects 
under the period when there is information control by the government. After that, we 
19 
choose some specific dates during the information chaotic period as our short-event 
windows. These dates are chosen when there are conflicts of information between the 
governmental and non-govemmental information sources. Our aim is to find out the 
directions in which stock market follows. 
Appraisal of the event's impact requires a measure of abnormal return {AR). 
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security minus the expected 
return of the firm over the event window. In the mathematically sense, abnormal 
return of firm i at event day t is 
a r , = r , - e [ r , \ x ] , 
where ARu, Ru and E R“ \X, are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns respectively 
for time period t. Xt is the conditioning information for the normal return model. In 
this thesis, market model will be employed to calculate the expected return since it is 
known to produce smaller abnormal return variances and cross-correlations than other 
models, resulting in a more powerful statistic test (Beaver, 1981; Strong, 1992). The 
market model is 
where a. is the intercept term and/?,, measures the marginal effect of the market 
return (R,„) on the return of security i. Here, the parameters are estimated from an 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. The estimation window is defined to be the 
2 0 
one year horizon prior to the event window. The abnormal return of any security i in 
the event date t {ARi^ is measured by the equation 
AR“=R「&丨-I 
A 
where d ， a r e the estimates of a .， . 
Once the abnormal returns are calculated, we then come to the design of 
testing framework. Important considerations are to determine the techniques for 
aggregating the abnormal returns and defining the null hypothesis. Since we are 
going to analyze the economic impact of SARS on certain industries, aggregating 
abnormal returns of different firms in the same industry is necessary. The industrial 
abnormal return for day t (lARt) is calculated by the formula 
MR, =f^�AR" ’ 
i=l 
where h is the market share of security i in the industry during date t. Sometimes, 
event window is of multiple days, therefore, we need to calculate the cumulative 
industrial abnormal return (CIARt� t , )• It is obtained by summing up the lAR, from 
time Tj to T2. The formula is 
CIARr^j. =2 碰， 
Statistical testing is highly emphasized in modem researches. In this thesis, 
abnormal returns are tested using Patell Standardized Residual (PSR) test statistic. In 
testing the industrial abnormal return for a one-day event period, the null hypothesis is 
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that the standardized industrial abnormal return equals zero at time t (Ho： SIARt = 0). 
The statistic is calculated by 
siar,-早, ^/AR, 
where 湖 is the estimated standard deviation of the industrial abnormal return during 
泰 
time 广14 Under the null hypothesis, each SIARt is Student t distributed with D-1 
degrees of freedom; with larger samples, the distribution approaches unit normal. For 
a multi-day event window, the null hypothesis is that the standardized cumulative 
industrial abnormal return equals zero (Ho： SCIARj- j^ = 0). The test statistic is 
obtained by the formula 
/ N 
where k. is the market share of security i in the industry, QJ, is the variance 
14 Each industrial abnormal return, IAR„ is assumed to have a mean of zero and a constant variance 
denoted as cr,〜及.The maximum likelihood estimate of this variance, 〜尺,，accounts for variance 
changes in the prediction and is illustrated as: 
o2 a2 1丄 1 , I凡I' 
• *=i -
where !狀'=maximum likelihood estimate of variance for the industry 
补 = v a r i a n c e of the industrial abnormal return during the estimation period i ^ ； 
D = the number of non-missing trading days used in the estimation window 
R "“=rate of return on the market index during the estimation period 
1 I) Y 丄 =mean rate of return on the market index during the estimation period ^ R = rate of return on the market index for day k of the estimation period 
2 2 
corrected for a multi-day event window, and SAR丨丨 is the standardized abnormal 
return of security i during time ？A s s u m i n g abnormal returns are normal and 
independent across the time period, the multi-day PSR test statistic approaches a 
standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. 
Apart from the Patell Standardized Residual (PSR) test, in order to compare 
the stock performances during the SARS sub-periods with that in the estimation 
window, we also employ the traditional heteroscedastic ^-test and non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test. The tests investigate whether the stocks are performing better or 
worse under the SARS period than the comparison period. 
15 Variance corrected for a multi-day event window is calculated by the following formulae: 
where (厂’�i) = event window 
D = number of non-missing trading day returns in the estimation window 
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4. Data 
The data used in this study are stock returns. Stock data in the Mainland 
China Stock Market is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR®) Database which is conducted by the Guo Tai An Information 
Technology Company Limtied. The CSMAR® Database is a major database system 
which encompasses data on the trading of the Mainland China stock market and the 
financial statements of listed companies in Mainland China. The database has been 
developed in line with such international database as CRSP and Compustat, and 
provides users with data on returns of individual stocks, market return, and aggregated 
market returns. To ensure absolute accuracy, data from other sources are also 
collected for comparisons and verifications, to the greatest extent possible that all 
errors be eliminated. 
Stock data in Hong Kong are obtained from two sources: Committee on 
Electronic Information Communication (CEIC) Database, which is constructed by the 
CEIC Data Company Limited, and the Datastream, which is conducted by the 
Thomson Corporation. These are the best in class databases which is constructed to 
fulfill research needs. The databases cover macroeconomic, industrial and financial 
time-series data which are readily for research uses. 
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5. Results 
In this section, we try to examine the effectiveness of information control used 
by the Chinese government during the SARS period by employing the event study 
methodology mentioned in section 3. A perfect, virtual control for the examination is 
impossible to find, since a new epidemic of SARS cannot turn up again to look at the 
stock market reaction in case there is no information censorship by the government. 
As a result, we supersede the ideal control by the SARS situation in Hong Kong. The 
reasons of choosing Hong Kong to do the comparison are that: (1) it is also an 
infection area which is severely affected by SARS; but (2) information flow in Hong 
Kong is considered as more transparent than that in Mainland China. Although it is 
imperfect, we believe that it is the most appropriate among what we can do. 
This section will be divided into two parts: subsection 5.1 explores the 
situation in Hong Kong while subsection 5.2 studies the case in Mainland China. 
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5.1 Hong Kong 
Market Index Performances 
Hong Kong is a good control for examining the situation in Mainland China 
because it is also a SARS infection area but the SARS news is more transparent. By 
looking at the Hong Kong case, we can see how an economy reacts to the SARS 
epidemic if there is an absence of information control by the government. 
The SARS period in Hong Kong is different from that in Mainland China, it 
started later (on February 9，2003) and terminated at around the same time (on June 
23，2003). The whole SARS duration is divided into two major parts with the 
watershed of March 12，2003 in which the Hong Kong government admitted the 
outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong. Prior to the watershed date is the pre-
announcement rumour period while it is the post-announcement event period after 
that day. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative weekly returns (CWRT) of the market index in 
Hong Kong during the SARS period. Week 13 to 17 represents the pre-announcement 
rumour period. This period is characterized by a widespread of rumours about the 
possible outbreak of a fatal and highly infectious atypical pneumonia, which has been 
originated in Guangdong, in Hong Kong. The rumours were transmitted through the 
computer networks, mobile phone messengers and the local media. 
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February 9，2003 is used as the beginning of SARS period in Hong Kong since 
many Hong Kong citizens started to recognize the existence of an atypical pneumonia, 
which was happening in Guangzhou, from the reports of Hong Kong media on that 
day. Some residents worried about the disease which led to a small-scale panic 
buying of certain herbal medicine and vinegar. These products were believed to be 
capable of preventing them from the disease. However, the effect of this negative 
news seems to be outweighed and the stock market has a slightly positive return. This 
is largely due to the successful containment announcement of the disease by the 
Guangzhou government and the rational belief of the investors that the disease is 
affecting Guangdong only but not Hong Kong. 
Negative returns set in starting from week 15 when doctors reported the first 
case of a flu-type virus now known as SARS. Also, there was side-street news which 
reported reception of atypical pneumonia patients in Hong Kong hospitals and the 
infection of health care workers. All these were alarming to the public and they began 
to believe that the threat of disease really came. The rumours were proved to be true 
when doctors announced the outbreak of disease in the Prince of Wales Hospital on 
March 10’ 2003. Official announcement of the disease outbreak was made on March 
12, 2003 and this marked the end of rumour period. Overall, the market returns in 
Hong Kong dropped by 2.49 percent during the pre-announcement rumour period. 
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After the official announcement of SARS outbreak on March 12, 2003，a long-
lasting battle of SARS containment began and it lasted until June 23，2003 when 
SARS epidemic in Hong Kong was marked the end by the WHO. From figure 1， 
market returns in the post-announcement period are characterized by a V-shape 
pattern. 
Before week 23, cumulative market returns has a decreasing trend which 
shows that SARS has negative impacts on the economy. During this period of time, 
SARS epidemic was serious. The number of new patients and deaths were of high 
levels which made people running scared. Investors retreated their investment 
because of the darkish environment in Hong Kong and the market index thus showed 
a downward trend. The decrease was the most serious when there was an outbreak in 
Amoy Garden in week 19. Bad news, such as blockade rumour, closure of schools 
and travel advisory made by the WHO, put further pressure on the stock market. The 
overall decrease in the market returns was 6.44 percent within this post-announcement 
short period. 
Hong Kong began to recover since week 23 and the recovery was very 
alarming. Outbreaks showed signs of coming under control, schools were reopened, 
and people were confident that the epidemic would be contained soon. Hong Kong 
government issued its $11.8 billion remedial measures to rescue the SARS affected 
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parties on week 23 was remarkably successful. Market index restored to its post-
SARS position by two weeks after the measures. The overall increase in the later 
SARS period was 15.72 percent. 
The above descriptions show a picture of SARS impacts on an economy in 
which it is free from the information control by the government. SARS should bring 
negative impacts to the economy when it is not successfully contained. No matter in 
the rumour period or the post-announcement short period, the market returns should 
be able to reflect the negative impacts caused by SARS and a decreasing trend of 
cumulative market returns should be the result. 
Industrial Index Performances 
Figure 2 and 3 show the cumulative weekly abnormal returns of "retailing" 
and "tourism “ industries in Hong Kong during the SARS period respectively. Week 
15 marks the beginning of the decreasing returns and the decrease stops on week 23. 
The total decreases of abnormal returns in retailing and tourism are 14.73 percent and 
17.95 percent respectively. Both industries start to bounce back after week 23. 
With transparent information, the industrial returns react accordingly. 
Industrial performances are highly linked to the SARS information. For example, 
negative industrial abnormal returns are found when there are side street rumours 
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about atypical pneumonia in Hong Kong, community spread of SARS in Amoy 
Garden and other estates, blockade rumour and travel advisory by the WHO. 
Industrial indices starts to bounce back when the SARS epidemic has signs of under 
control and when the government announces its $11.8 billion remedial assistance on 
the SARS affected parties on week 23. 
From the graphical approach, we conclude that the industries react according 
to SARS information and the trend should be consistent with the evolution of SARS. 
Similar results are found when applying htest and Mann-Whitney test and the results 
are presented on table 1 and 2 respectively. 
SARS brings negative impacts to both retailing and tourism industries for a 
short duration only. By considering the rumour period, post-announcement short and 
long periods, only the data of post-announcement short period is significant. The 
means of industrial returns of retailing and tourism industries during the post-
announcement short period significantly underperform their comparison period by 
one percent and 2.18 percent respectively. The abnormal returns in other periods are 
not significant. 
In conclusion, if the information is transparent, negative impacts of SARS on 
services industries should be reflected after the official announcement and there 
should be no significant abnormal returns before it. 
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5.2 Mainland China 
5.2.1 SARS Sub-periods in Mainland China 
Using event study to analyze SARS event is difficult. Unlike the traditional 
finance topics like merger and acquisition, dividend proposals and earning 
announcements that the event date is usually once and for all, SARS lasted for more 
than seven months in Mainland China and the SARS information was continuous 
throughout the entire SARS period. Picking event date is thus difficult as there are 
multiple probable days for investigation. In order to effectively examine the events, 
defining and choosing the appropriate event dates are important. Since the core of 
this thesis lies on "SARS information", therefore, we would classify the entire SARS 
period into four sub-periods by the attribute of information: rumour period, post-
rumour period, information chaotic period and information transparent period. 
Appendix 3 summarizes the main events of SARS under each period and a brief 
description will be shown below. 
Rumour period 
This period is full of rumours, fears, uncertainties and panics. It lasted from 
the outbreak of SARS in Heyuan, Mainland China on November 16, 2002 to the 
temporary termination of SARS panic on February 19, 2003. When facing a new 
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disease which may be fatal, it was normal that the public will worry. As the disease 
was spreading rapidly in the community, while the traditional medication was proved 
unsuccessful, the public became running scared and panics resulted. People began 
emptying pharmaceutical stocks of any medicine they thought may protect them. 
Food and necessities were extensively bought since people preferred staying at home 
to avoid social interaction. People worried about this disease and tried to let their 
friends and relatives know to prevent it. The message was sent with an alarming high 
speed through telephonic and computerized networks. Four panics appeared, with the 
first one in Heyuan，Foshan, one in Zhongshan and the last two in Guangzhou. To 
solve public's fears, local governments made clarifications and claimed that the 
epidemic was under control every time when there was a panic. Media did not have 
complete freedom in reporting the SARS situation in Mainland China and was 
allowed to broadcast positive news only. Nanfan Daily was criticized by the local 
government for broadcasting SARS situation without permission of the government. 
The information censorship seemed to be useful. After the a n n o u n c e m e n t of victory 
to the disease by the Guangdong government on February 19，2003，people believed 




This was a period when SARS seemed to be disappeared in Mainland China. 
Although daily increase of new patients was at least two-digit during this period of 
time and the SARS epidemic had spread to other provinces, the public could not 
recognize it.'^ Media had no reports on it either. Despite global alert of SARS and 
travel warning made by the WHO on March 12，2003 and March 15, 2003 
respectively, everything seemed have returned to normal. 
Information Chaotic period 
Considering the nature of information, information chaotic period should be 
the most interesting among the four classified sub-periods. SARS information came 
from different sources, including the official announcements by the Chinese 
government, investigation reports of the WHO experts, reports of local and 
international media, information release by the government insiders and rumours 
transmitted among citizens. During this period, the information released by the 
government was always contradictory to the non-govemmental sources. It was 
interesting to have a look if the public believed in governmental announcements when 
facing non-govemmental counteracting forces. 
16 A guess speaker, who helped to combat SARS in Guangdong, disclosed the true SARS situation in 
Guangdong in a CCTV program that new SARS patients was at least of two-digit number since mid-
February. (Source: http://www.pk:usimba.com/sars/dsi.htm) 
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Information chaotic period started on March 21, 2003. An editorial of the 
Wall Street Journal criticized the Chinese government, claiming that it had hidden the 
reality of SARS infection in Mainland China. This is the first challenge from the 
foreign press to question the validity of SARS information provided by the Chinese 
government. On March 25, 2003，foreign press worried if there was SARS outbreak 
in Beijing, Mainland China. This worry came from a report in Hong Kong claiming 
"nine air passengers linked to a 15 March flight from Hong Kong to Beijing develop 
SARS after returning to Hong Kong." A week later, the WHO recommended persons 
traveling to Guangdong Province in Mainland China to postpone all but essential 
travel, which was the most stringent travel advisory issued by the WHO in its 55-year 
history. This intensified people's fears of SARS situation in Mainland China. 
When critique emerged, the Chinese government always reacted by updating 
the SARS infection figures and emphasizing the SARS situation was under control. 
From the official announced figures, the SARS situation in Beijing seemed to be 
insignificant. However, it was doubtful whether the official announced figures 
reflected the reality. Starting from April 7，2003, side-street news, which claimed that 
SARS was raging the community, was widespread in Beijing. Angered by the 
unrealistic data provided by the government, Doctor Jiang Yanyong wrote a letter to 
the Time Magazine, revealing what he knew about the SARS epidemic in Beijing. 
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Attempts to cheat the WHO investigation team by the medical hospitals were 
discovered and reported in the Time Magazine. On April 16，2003, the WHO team 
openly criticized Chinese government for the inadequate reporting of SARS cases in 
Beijing, especially those in the military hospitals. The estimated number of cases in 
Beijing should be at least five times more than the official figures. All these were 
challenging to the official announcement. Finally, on April 20, 2003, top leaders in 
the Chinese government announced a national battle of SARS and misleading 
information of SARS was prohibited. 
Information Transparent period 
This period lasted from April 20’ 2003 to June 24，2003. As the top leaders in 
the Chinese government openly declared a national battle in containing SARS, SARS 
information became much more frequent and transparent. There were daily reports of 
SARS situation in Mainland China, instead of the previous adoption of one report per 
five days. Furthermore, conditions in military hospitals were disclosed too. SARS 
information provided by the government improved in term of both quantity and 
quality. The epidemic was then under control gradually. June 24，2003 marked the 
end of SARS in Mainland China as Beijing, the last region which was under the 
inspection of the WHO, was defrocked from the list of SARS infection areas. 
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5.2.2 Stock Performances during SARS Sub-periods 
Market Index Performances 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative weekly returns of market index in Mainland 
China during the SARS period. SARS lasted for more than seven months since its 
emergence in Heyuan, on November 16，2002. According to the information involved, 
we classify the whole SARS period into four sub-periods which have already been 
mentioned in section 2.5. These four sub-periods are the basis for our analysis. 
The first sub-period is "rumourperiod" which includes week one to week 12. 
Generally, it shows an increasing trend with an overall increase in the cumulative 
market returns of 8.59 percent. Although four panics of the disease happened (one in 
Heyuan in week five, one in Zhongshan in week seven and two in Guangzhou in week 
12), local governments were able to suppress the panics by official announcement or 
controlled media broadcasting. 
"Post-rumour period" lasted from week 12 to week 17. Atypical pneumonia 
seemed to be disappeared from people's scope after the Guangzhou government 
announced victory to the disease. The market returns did not fluctuate much during 
this sub-period. 
"Information chaotic period" was a period when the information of SARS 
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appeared to have a chaotic pattern. Information came from different sources with 
contradictory contents. It consists of one month, from week 17 to week 21. Within 
this period, Chinese government consecutively provided positive news of 
macroeconomic indicators (GDP and price level), issued reforms in the stock market 
system and claimed that SARS epidemic was under control although it is not the case. 
Cumulative market return was thus increasing throughout the period with a total 
increase of 7.2 percent. 
Unlike the previous periods, SARS information provided by the government 
during the "information transparent period" was credible. The Chinese government 
promised to offer timely and accurate SARS information to the public. SARS had a 
significant negative impact to the Mainland China stock market within a short period. 
Week 22 marked a 7.05 percent decrease in market returns. After a rebound of returns 
for four consecutive weeks, it showed a decreasing trend again. Cumulative market 
returns dropped by 9.2 percent in this period. 
All in all, the performance of market index in Mainland China during the 
SARS period is rather irregular. It is normal to see a negative shock caused by SARS 
after the official announcement which is consistent with the case in Hong Kong. 
However, cumulative weekly returns of the market index increase rather than decrease 
which is contradictory to the case in Hong Kong. Especially when we look at the 
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information chaotic period where information censorship is used frequently by the 
government, sharp increase in the returns may imply that the information control by 
the government is effective，general investors are fooled by the government and 
neglect the impacts caused by SARS. 
Industrial Index Performances 
Although the previous section ends at a possible conclusion that the 
information control by the Chinese government is effective in the market level as the 
market returns do not incorporate the shock caused by SARS prior to the official 
announcement on April 20, 2003, this conclusion might be biased when we consider 
the economic structure in Mainland China. According to the figures provided by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB)，services sectors in Mainland China and Hong Kong 
accounted for 33.1 percent and 84.6 percent respectively.'^ As we know that SARS 
affected services sector the most, the abnormal phenomenon of the market returns in 
Mainland China was a result of a relatively small proportion of services sector in the 
economic structure. The major sector, manufacturing sector, was not directly and 
severely affected by SARS which helped the market index in Mainland China 
withstand negative shock. In order to remove the influencing factor caused by 
17 See http://www.adb.Org/Documents/Book:s/Kev Indicators/2004/pdf/rt 13.pdf. 
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economic structure, industrial returns are superior to market returns as indicators for 
analysis. Therefore, we pick the SARS sensitive industries, which are retailing and 
tourism, to estimate the effectiveness of information control by the Chinese 
government. 
Figure 5 shows the cumulative weekly abnormal returns of "retailing" 
industry in the Mainland China stock market during the SARS period. Official 
announcement of SARS outbreak is made on week 22 but it does show a positive 
abnormal weekly return. Before the official announcement, abnormal returns of 
retailing industry are usually negative. Cumulative abnormal returns have a 
decreasing trend. Total decreases of industrial abnormal returns are 2.94，2.24 and 
4.58 percents in the rumour, post-rumour and information chaotic periods respectively. 
The cumulative abnormal returns bounce back in week 25 when the Chinese 
government announces its remedial measures to SARS affected parties. 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative weekly abnormal returns of "tourism “ industry 
in Mainland China during the SARS period. Similar to the case of retailing industry, 
the cumulative abnormal returns drop before the official announcement. During the 
rumour, post-rumour and information chaotic periods, cumulative abnormal returns 
drop by 1.42, 1.2 and 4.03 percents respectively. Recovery starts on week 25 where 
the remedial measures by the government are likely to be successful. 
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By looking at the graphs, we can conclude that the information control by the 
government is not successful since the negative impacts of SARS have already been 
captured in the stock market before the official SARS outbreak announcement. 
Statistical analysis offers the same conclusion. Average industrial returns of 
the four SARS sub-periods are calculated and then compared with the comparison 
period. Heteroscedastic /-test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney test are used to do 
the analysis and the findings are presented on table 3 and 4. Both industries record 
significant negative abnormal returns before the official SARS outbreak 
announcement. This implies investors are not fooled by the government, they have 
recognized the potential impacts of the unknown disease and have adjusted their 
investment already. As a result, information control is ineffective under SARS event. 
5.2.3 Stock Performances during Information Chaotic Period 
In the previous section, the whole SARS period is under our investigation. 
Since the negative impacts of SARS on the SARS sensitive industries have already 
been captured in the stock market under the period of information censorship by the 
Chinese government, it is evident that information control by the government is 
ineffective in preventing SARS impacts from occurring. Another interest of this 
thesis is to explore the stock market responses when there is conflicting SARS 
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information in the economy. Information chaotic period is characterized by its nature 
of conflicting information, and thus is under our investigation specifically. Daily 
returns will be used in this section to see if there are any abnormal performances in 
the stock market. 
Market Index Performances 
Figure 7 reports the cumulative market returns (CMRs) in the Mainland China 
Stock Market during the information chaotic period. Day 82 is the beginning of 
information chaotic period since the first international challenge on the credibility of 
SARS information announced by the Chinese government occurs during that day. 
Governmental and non-govemmental SARS information is contradictory during the 
period. Whenever there was a challenge on the SARS situation on Mainland China, 
the government officials came up and defended SARS situation was under control. 
The general trend of the market index is increasing, with a total increase in CMRs by 
7.25 percent. The major increase lies between day 94 to 99 when the government 
announced a lot of good news to the public, including favourable news on GDP, 
inflation and the stock market. The market returns increase by 6.83 percent. The 
negative impacts of SARS are apparent only after the official SARS outbreak 
announcement on April 20，2003. 
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Industrial Index Performances 
The industrial indices, on the other hand, react differently to the market 
indices. Both retailing and tourism industries are having decreasing trends on their 
returns during the information chaotic period. Figure 8 and 9 show the CARs of 
retailing and tourism industries during the information chaotic period in Mainland 
China. The overall decreases of returns in retailing and tourism industries are 4.16 
and 2.08 percents respectively. The major decreases started after day 93 and the 
returns fluctuated around the official announcement day of day 103. 
From the graphs, we can see that SARS impacts on retailing and tourism 
industries are not eliminated under information control by the government. The 
continuous decrease in the CARs during the information chaotic period may show us 
that information censorship and the defense made by the government are useless. The 
public is capable of identifying the validity of different information and, thus, not 
fooled by the government. 
Stock Market Reaction under conflicting SARS Information 
This section focuses on examining the strength of governmental and non-
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governmental SARS information on the stock market. We try to investigate whether 
the returns of SARS sensitive industries follow governmental information or non-
governmental information. Unlike the previous subsection where the trends of CARs 
in the information chaotic period are examined, this subsection is much detailed. 
Certain SARS information is selected and we try to investigate the abnormal returns 
day by day. 
We picked event day 93 to 100 to be our studying targets because information 
contradictions on these eight days are the tensest. Appendix 17 summarizes the 
governmental and non-govemmental SARS information during these eight studying 
days. Instead of using lARt to do the test on day t, CIARt-i, /+i is used to the statistical 
test on day t instead. It is due to the timing of SARS information going public. 
Sometimes, the SARS information has already been recognized by the public before 
the public announcement and the effects have already been absorbed in the stock 
market in advance; while the information is sometimes announced after the trading 
time in the stock market, thus the effects can only be absorbed in the stock market one 
day after the announcement. Therefore, using cumulative industrial abnormal returns 
from day M to 什1 {CIARt.\. /+i) is considered to be more appropriate. 
Table 5 reports the stock responses of the retailing and tourism industries 
during the period with tense contradictions of SARS information. The industrial 
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indices are likely to follow non-govemmental SARS information and the positive 
news announced by the government does not have a remedial result. 
On day 93, side-street news of SARS outbreak in Beijing was transmitting 
around Beijing through whatever channels. The news reported SARS patients 
appeared in many hospitals and the number of SARS patients was increasing. Some 
hospitals even did not have vacancy to receive new patients. The news made many 
people panic. On the other hand, leaders in the Chinese government were confident to 
claim that Chinese government had the ability to contain SARS epidemic. An official 
in the Ministry of Health also announced the number of SARS patients in Beijing was 
22 and claimed that there was no need to worry about it. With the contradictory 
information, both industries react by significant negative abnormal returns. Retailing 
industry has a negative abnormal return of-1.91 percent while tourism industry has a 
negative abnormal return of -1.45 percent. 
On day 94，the WHO experts criticized the validity of the number of SARS 
patients announced by the Ministry of Health. They claimed that the number 
officially reported did not include those in the military hospitals. Apart from the 
WHO criticism, Beijing media had reported SARS battle in local hospitals, judging by 
the enormous number of reports, many citizens believed the officially announced data 
was underestimated. Officials of the Ministry of Health updated the SARS figures 
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and claimed the epidemic was under control. Once again, the industrial indices 
follow non-govemmental information. Both industries have significant negative 
abnormal returns, in which retailing and tourism industries record -2.33 and -2.62 
percents respectively. 
Angered by the underestimated figures announced by Zhang Wenkong, head 
of Ministry of Health, Doctor Jiang Yanyong wrote a letter to disclose the true 
situation of SARS in Beijing. The letter was reported on the Time Magazine on day 
95. To defend for the SARS situation in Mainland China, officials in the Chinese 
government clarified that the official information provided by the government was 
reliable on day 96. The abnormal returns on these two days are also significantly 
negative. For retailing industry, the abnormal returns are -1.96 percent and -2.08 
percent on day 95 and 96 respectively. For tourism industry, the abnormal returns are 
-1.78 percent and -1.57 percent on day 95 and 96 respectively. 
From day 97 to 100，abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero 
with the exception of retailing industry on day 100. Experts of the WHO came to 
Mainland China to do investigation of SARS in Beijing on day 97. They reported the 
investigation results on day 100 which claimed that the officially announced figures 
were at least understated by five times. Retailing industry reacts by a significant 
negative abnormal return of-1.18 percent. 
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We can conclude from the above analysis that industrial returns react 
according to the information provided by the non-govemment sources. Investors have 
the ability in detecting the real situation from an information chaotic environment and 
adjust their investment decisions. The divergence between the nature of information 
released by the government and the industrial performances shows that the 
information control by the government is ineffective. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we employ event study methodology to test whether information 
control by the Chinese government is effective during the SARS period. Our 
empirical work shows that information control may be effective in the market level 
but should be ineffective in the industrial level. The market index in the Mainland 
China stock market has a sharp increase during the information chaotic period. This 
is the time when the Chinese government actively uses information control to 
suppress chaos and panics. This sharp increase in the market index, neglecting the 
SARS situation was intense during that period of time, might prove that the 
information control is successful. However, this conclusion is not concrete when 
considering economic structure of Mainland China. Using industrial indices enables 
us to solve the problem and the findings prove information censorship by the Chinese 
government is ineffective. Negative impacts of SARS have already been captured in 
the pre-announcement period, especially the information chaotic period. When facing 
conflicting SARS information by different sources, the SARS sensitive industries 
react largely on the non-govemment information. Understating SARS figures to 
claim SARS is under control by the Chinese government is not successful. Investors 
have the ability in verifying the credibility of information provided from different 
sources and do not act blindly according to the government. 
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Information control has always been the tactic used by the Chinese 
government although international press continues to raise criticisms on it. In order to 
maintain stability, covering up the shocks seems a probable method but the 
consequences might be large. Tangshan Earthquake in 1976 is an example. After the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976，the political environment was unstable. Government 
officials feared the political consequences of the earthquake. They tried to cover up 
the earthquake's magnitude, claimed the situation was well in hand and refused all 
outside aids. Partly as a result, casualty figures were astronomical. SARS is another 
example. At the early stage of SARS epidemic in Guangdong, attitude of local 
governments in facing the disease was not appropriate. Officials claimed the situation 
was under control but it was not the case. Quarantine of possible SARS patients was 
insufficient. This led to the spread of disease not only to other parts in Mainland 
China, but to the rest of the world. 
Suppressing news is difficult nowadays with modem communication networks. 
Rumours of the disease were transmitted quickly through mobile phone messengers 
and emails. Although the Chinese government has certain power in controlling the 
media, a complete information control cannot be attained with modem technology. 
Therefore, the government should alter its principle from blocking information to 
providing accurate, timely and transparent information. Due to the highly effective 
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channels of information transmission now in place, any apparent lack of transparency 
in providing information is likely to cause second guessing and panic among the 
general public. Providing information about the shocks is a difficult task. A balance 
has to be struck between alerting people to the risks involved and preventing them 
from panicking and overreacting. To minimize the impact of shocks, blocking 
information and pretending nothing happens is no longer the best method. 
Governments should utilize the increasing influence of the modem media to 
disseminate information so as to ensure rational thinking and sensible actions of 
citizens. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Weekly Returns (CWR) of the market index in Hong Kong during the SARS period 
Cumulative Weekly Returns (CWR) of the market index 
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Table 1; Performances of SARS sensitive industries in Hong Kon样 during the SARS period using (-test  
(1) Retailing (2) Tourism  
Period Number of Event group's Event group's Event group's Event group's  
trading days mean (s.d.) t-value mean (s.d.) t-value 
Comparison 244 -0.15% 
(1.80%) (3.95%) 
Pre-event -0.37% 0.34% n o 
rumour (2.02%) u.糾 (1.24%) 
Post- announcement -1.03% -2 33% 
(short) 23 (1.31%) 2.629- J:二:) 2.612** 
Post- announcement -0.12% -0.35% . . . 
(long) (2.08%) 0.35 (2.72%) 0.40 
Whole 91 -0.18% -0.18% ^ 
(2.06%) 贴 6 (2.45%) 
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Performance of SARS sensitive industries in Hong Kong during the SARS period using 
Mann-Whitney test  
(1) Retailing (2) Tourism 
Period Number of Median return W-value Median return W-value trading days 
Comparison 244 0.01% 0.25% 
22 -0.46% 2613 0.54% 39635 rumour 
Post- announcement 公 -0.76% 2223** -2.13% 1931** 
(short) 
Post-announcement ^^ -0.37% 10884 -0.35% 11355 
(long) 
Whole 91 -0.39% 15015 -0.08 49463 
Notes. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Performance of SARS sensitive industries in Mainland China during the SARS period 
using f test  
(1) Retailing (2) Tourism  
Period Number of Event group's Event group's Event group's Event group's  
trading days mean (s.d.) t-value mean (s.d.) t-value 
Comparison 237 0.07% 0.03% (0.59%) (1.04%) 
Rumour 60 -0.00% (0.51%) • (0.65%) 
Post-rumour 21 棚 � 2 968** -0.01% 017 
(0.38%) z‘VD5 (0.48%) 
Information -0.76% -0.80% * 
Chaotic (1.01%) 3.686 (i.ii%) 丄 
Information -0.22% -0.19% . . . 
transparent (1.33%) (1.52%) • 
-。le 142 二 嫌 * 二 ） 1.72 
'Notes. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Performance of SARS sensitive industries in Mainland China during the SARS period 
using Mann-Whitney test  
(1) Retailing (2) Tourism  
Period Number of Median return W-value Median return W-value trading days 
Comparison 237 0.04% -0.05% 
Rumour 60 -0.10% 6617.5** -0.03% 26866 
Post-rumour 21 -0.36% 1376** 0.21% 22951 
Jj^formation 21 -0.63% 1172** -0.67% 1393** Chaotic 
I n f a — t i o n 4 0 0.29% 24706 0.15% 24702 transparent 
Whole 142 -0.13% 21390.5** -0.06% 24210 
Notes-. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Stock Responses of SARS-sensitive industries with conflicting SARS information 
Date Day Official Unofficial Retailing Tourism 
Announcement Announcement Industry Industry  
{CIAR) (CIAR) 
^P^jJ^' + - -0.0191** -0.0145* 
(3.780) (-1.977) 
+ - -0.0233** -0.0262** 
_ (-4.605) (-3.570) 
- -0.0196** -0.0178* 
⑴ (-3.873) (-2.424) 
A^iJ^G’ + -0.0208** -0.0157* 
衝 (-4.100) (-2.134) 
Agri夂11’ 97 - -0.0017 -0.0127 
(-0.334) (-1.715) 
98 - -0.0048 -0.0069 
(-0.962) (-0.921) 
A^iJ^qlj， - . 0 . 0 0 6 6 0 . 0 0 6 6 
⑴ （-1.324) (0.911) 
A f i J ^ 6， 100 _ - 0 . 0 1 1 8 * 0 .011 
2003 (2.353) (1.506) 
Notes: represents positive news; '-'represents negative news. 
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Appendix 1: Cumulative Number of Reported Cases of SARS by July 11，2003 
Cumulative Number of Number Date last Date for which 
Country number^of deaths recovered� probable case cumulative number of 
case(s) reported cases is current 
Australia 5 0 5 12/May/2003 27/Jun/2003 
Brazil 1 0 1 9/Jun/2003 1/Jul/2003 
Canada" 250 38 194 9/Jul/2003 lO/Jul/2003 
Mainland China^ 5327 348 4941 25/Jun/2003 11/Jul/2003 
Hong Kong 6 1755 298 1433 Il/Jun/2003 11/Jul/2003 
Macao 1 0 1 21/May/2003 lO/Jul/2003 
Taiwan 671 84 507 19/Jun/2003 11/Jul/2003 
Colombia 1 0 1 5/May/2003 5/May/2003 
Finland 1 0 1 7/May/2003 20/May/2003 
France 7 1 6 9/May/2003 11/Jul/2003 
Germany 10 0 9 4/Jun/2003 23/Jun/2003 
India 3 0 3 13/May/2003 14/May/2003 
Indonesia 2 0 2 23/Apr/2003 19/Jun/2003 
Italy 4 0 4 29/Apr/2003 8/Jul/2003 
Kuwait 1 0 1 9/Apr/2003 20/Apr/2003 
Malaysia 5 2 3 20/May/2003 4/Jul/2003 
I  
Mongolia 9 0 9 6/May/2003 2/Jun/2003 
New Zealand 1 0 1 30/Apr/2003 25/Jun/2003 
Philippines 14 2 12 15/May/2003 11/Jul/2003 
Ireland 1 0 1 21/Mar/2003 12/Jun/2003 
I  j Korea 3 0 3 14/May/2003 2/Jul/2003 
I 
I 1 ] 1 1 1  
I Romania I 0 1 27/Mar/2003 22/Apr/2003 I  
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Russian Federation 1 0 0 31/May/2003 31/May/2003 
Singapore 206 32 172 18/May/2003 7/Jul/2003 
South Africa 1 1 0 9/Apr/2003 3/May/2003 
Spain 1 0 1 2/Apr/2003 5/Jun/2003 
Sweden 3 0 3 18/Apr/2003 13/May/2003 
Switzerland 1 0 1 17/Mar/2003 16/May/2003 
Thailand 9 2 7 7/Jun/2003 1/Jul/2003 
England 4 0 4 29/Apr/2003 30/Jun/2003 
United States' 75 0 67 23/Jun/2003 9/Jul/2003 
Viet Nam 63 5 58 14/Apr/2003 7/Jun/2003 
Total 8437 813 7452 
Source: the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(http://www.who.int/csr/sars/countrv/2003 07 11/en/) 
Note: 
- Cumulative number of cases includes number of deaths. 
- As SARS is a diagnosis of exclusion, the status of a reported case may change over time. This means that 
previously reported cases may be discarded after further investigation and follow-up. 
1. The start of the period of surveillance has been changed to 1 November 2002 to capture cases of atypical 
pneumonia in Mainland China that are now recognized as being cases of SARS. 
2. A decrease in the number of cumulative cases and discrepancies in the difference between cumulative 
number of cases of the last and the current WHO update are attributed to the discarding of cases. 
3. Includes cases who are "discharged" or "recovered" as reported by the national public health authorities. 
4. The date of onset of the most recent probable SARS case in Canada was 12 June, the last date of 
isolation of a probable case SARS case was also June 12. 
5. The date of onset of the most recent probable SARS case in Mainland China was June 3. The date of 
isolation of this case was 6 June 2003. 
6. One death attributed to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China occurred in a case 
medically transferred from Viet Nam. 
7. From 26 June 2003, the number of recovered represents all probable cases who were never hospitalized 
or who were hospitalized and reported as discharged from the hospital. The previous reports only 
counted those who had been hospitalized and discharged. 
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Appendix 2: Chronology of SARS events in Mainland China 
Date Day Event  
16/11 /2002 1 - First known case of atypical pneumonia occurs in Foshan City, Guangdong 
Province, Mainland China, but was not identified until much later 
15/12/2002 21 - First panic of atypical pneumonia in Heyuan, Foshan 
2/1/2003 33 - Second panic of atypical pneumonia in Zhongshan 
2/2/2003 53 - Outbreak of SARS in Guangzhou 
8/2/2003 53 - Third panic of atypical pneumonia in Guangzhou 
11/2/2003 54 - Guangzhou government reported the situation of the disease and claimed that 
the disease was under control. 
12/2/2003 55 - Fourth panic in Guangzhou 
17/3/2003 78 - Mainland China provides a first brief report to WHO about the Guangdong 
outbreak. The outbreak is said to have tapered off. 
2/4/2003 90 - Travel recommendations for Guangdong Province 
11/4/2003 97 - Beijing was listed as an area with local transmission. 
20/4/2003 103 - Chinese government launched a national battle in containing SARS, 
traditional week-long International Labour Holiday was announced to be 
shortened. 
23/4/2003 105 - Closure of primary and secondary schools to prevent spread of SARS. 
- T r a v e l recommendations for Beijing 
13/5/2003 112 - Outbreaks at the remaining initial sites showed signs of coming under control. 
3/6/2003 127 - The number of newly reported probable cases in Mainland China declined to 
a weekly average of slightly more than two. 
24/6/2003 142 - Travel recommendations were removed for Beijing, the last remaining area 
subject to WHO travel advice, 
- Beijing was also removed from the list of areas with recent local 
transmission. 
Source: (a) "SARS: Chronology of a serial killer", the WHO. 
(http://www.who.int/csr/doi-i/2003 07 04/en/index.html) 
(b) "Chronology of SARS", Nanfang Daily 
(http://www.nanfangdailv.com.cn) 
(c) "SARS dashiji", the Peking University 
(http://www.pk.usimba.com/sars/dsi.htm') 
(d) South China Morning Post 
(http://www.scmp.com) 
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Appendix 3: Classification of SARS sub-periods in Mainland China and main events involved. 
(I) Rumour Period (16/11/2002-19/2/2003) 
Date Day Event 
16/11/2002 1 - First case of SARS in Heyuan, Mainland China 
15/12/2002 21 - First panic of atypical pneumonia in Heyuan 
- Heyuan government denied having disease 
2/1/2003 33 - Second panic of atypical pneumonia in Zhongshan 
4/1/2003 35 - Local government made clarifications for the rumours and doctors were 
invited to claim that atypical pneumonia was not a severe sickness 
2/2/2003 53 - Outbreak of SARS in Guangzhou 
8/2/2003 53 - Third panic of atypical pneumonia in Guangzhou 
- SARS reports were widespread in Guangdong's newspaper 
10/2/2003 53 - The WHO Beijing office receives an email message describing a "strange 
contagious disease" that has "already left more than 100 people dead" in 
Guangdong Province in the space of one week. 
- The message further describes "a 'panic' attitude", where people are 
emptying pharmaceutical stocks of any medicine they think may protect 
them." 
11 /2/2003 54 - Guangzhou government reported the situation of disease and claimed that 
the disease was under control. 
12/2/2003 55 - Fourth panic of atypical pneumonia in Guangzhou 
13/2/2003 56 - Guangzhou government used media to broadcast positive news of the 
disease situation. 
18/2/2003 59 - Chinese government claimed that the pathogen of atypical pneumonia was 
found. 
- Medical experts opposed the official announcement, those newspapers 
which reported the viewpoints of medical experts were criticized. 
19/2/2003 60 - Guangdong government announced victory to the disease. 
(II) Post-rumour period (20/2/2003-20/3/2003) 
Date Day Event 
24/2/2003 63 - The Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) picked up a report 
stating that over 50 hospital staff is infected with a "mysterious pneumonia" 
in the city of Guangzhou. 
1 /3/2003 68 - First case of SARS in Beijing was found but did not report to the public. 
12/3/2003 75 - The WHO issued its first global alert of severe atypical pneumonia. 
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15/3/2003 78 - The WHO issued a rare travel advisory of SARS. 
17/3/2003 78 - Mainland China provided a first brief report to the WHO about the 
Guangzhou outbreak. The outbreak is said to have tapered off. 
(Ill) Information chaotic period (21/3/2003-19/4/2003) 
Date Day Event 
21/3/2003 82 - First challenge from the foreign press about the information validity 
provided by the Chinese government: an editorial of Wall Street Journal 
reported that the Chinese government had hidden the real circumstances of 
SARS in Mainland China. 
25/3/2003 84 - Hong Kong media reported that nine air passengers linked to a 15 March 
flight from Hong Kong to Beijing developed SARS after returning to Hong 
Kong 
- First official response to SARS: the Chinese government claimed that SARS 
was under control. 
27/3/2003 86 - Mainland China updated the information of SARS in Guangdong Province. 
1/4/2003 89 - International journalists questioned the credibility of information provided 
by the Chinese government. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
defended that SARS was under control in Mainland China. 
3/4/2003 91 - Zhang Wenkong, Chinese Minister of Health, appeared on national 
television to address SARS-related issues. He reported the SARS 
circumstances in Mainland China and claimed that SARS had been under 
control. 
9/4/2003 95 - Angered by the unrealistic data presented by the Minister of Health, Doctor 
Jiang Yanyong wrote a letter to disclose the true situation of SARS in 
Beijing and got published in Time Magazine. 
10/4/2003 96 - Chinese government clarified that the official information provided about 
SARS was reliable. 
11/4/2003 97 - The WHO announced that SARS infection in Guangzhou, Mainland China 
was under control. 
12/4/2003 98 - Chinese government forbad all tourist trips to Southeast Asia. 
16/4/2003 100 - The WHO adjusted their trust to the Chinese government. The WHO 
experts believed that the official data of Beijing epidemic was at least 
understated by five times. 
(IV) Information Transparent Period (20/4/2003-24/6/2003) 
Date Day Event 
20/4/2003 103 - Chinese government stopped misleading the public. The numbers of SARS 
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patients and deaths in Beijing were revised and the real data was 10 times 
more than the previous announcement. 
- Chinese government launched its national battle of SARS. 
21/4/2003 103 - Chinese authorities announced that the traditional week-long May Day 
holiday would be shortened, 
23/4/2003 105 - Rumour of Beijing was becoming a blockade 
24/4/2003 106 - Chinese government announced that all school would be closed starting on 
25/4/2003 
13/5/2003 112 - Outbreaks in the remaining sites showed signs of coming under control. 
24/6/2003 142 - Beijing was removed from the list of SARS regions with recent local 
transmission and travel warning was cancelled. 
Source: (a) "SARS: Chronology of a serial killer", the WHO. 
('http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 04/en/index.htmn 
(b) "Chronology of SARS", Nanfang Daily 
(http://www.nanfangdailv.com.cn) 
(c) "SARS dashiji", the Peking University 
(http://www.Dkusimba.com/sars/dsi.htm) 
(d) South China Morning Post 
(http://www.scmp.com) 
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Appendix 4: Weekly Returns (WR) and Cumulative Weekly Returns (CWR) of market index 
in the Hong Kong Stock Market during the SARS period  
Event Week Weekly Returns 
� Weekly Returns 
1 0.0177 0.0177 
2 0.0024 0.0201 
3 -0.0048 0.0153 
4 -0.0207 -0.0054 
5 -0.0079 -0.0133 
6 -0.0166 -0.0299 
7 0.0133 -0.0165 
8 0.0187 0.0022 
9 -0.0105 -0.0084 
10 -0.0137 -0.0221 
11 -0.0173 -0.0393 
12 -0.0073 -0.0466 
13 0.0031 -0.0436 
14 0.0056 -0.0380 
15 -0.0124 -0.0504 
16 -0.0262 -0.0766 
17 0.0081 -0.0685 
18 0.0239 -0.0447 
19 -0.0292 -0.0739 
20 -0.0064 -0.0803 
21 -0.0193 -0.0996 
22 -0.0091 -0.1087 
23 -0.0243 -0.1330 
24 0.0486 -0.0844 
25 0.0278 -0.0566 
26 0.0062 -0.0503 
27 0.0277 -0.0226 
28 0.0195 -0.0031 
29 0.0223 0.0192 
30 0.0218 0.0410 
31 0.0067 0.0477 
^ -0.0235 0.0242 
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Appendix 5: Weekly Returns (WR) and Cumulative Weekly Returns (CWR) of the market 
index in Mainland China during the SARS period  
Event Week Weekly Returns 尸” 
Weekly Returns 
1 -0.0525 -0.0525 
2 0.0321 -0.0204 
3 -0.0208 -0.0412 
4 -0.0036 -0.0448 
5 0.0253 -0.0196 
6 -0.0350 -0.0545 
7 -0.0403 -0.0948 
8 0.0474 -0.0474 
9 0.0617 0.0144 
10 -0.0043 0.0101 
11 0.0141 0.0242 
12 0.0092 0.0334 
13 -0.0204 0.0130 
14 0.0194 0.0325 
15 -0.0141 0.0184 
16 -0.0188 -0.0004 
17 0.0014 0.0011 
18 0.0074 0.0085 
19 0.0181 0.0265 
20 0.0222 0.0487 
21 0.0244 0.0731 
22 -0.0705 0.0026 
23 0.0095 0.0121 
24 0.0141 0.0262 
25 0.0063 0.0325 
26 0.0160 0.0485 
27 -0.0320 0.0165 
28 0.0115 0.0280 
29 -0.0230 0.0050 
^ -0.0239 -0.0189 
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Appendix 6: A list of listed firms in the Hong Kong Stock Market which are classified into the tourism industry  
Stock Code Company Name  
37 Far East Hotels & Entertainment Limited 
45 Hongkong & Shanghai Hotels Limited 
51 Harbour Centre Development Limited 
69 Shangri-La Asia Limited — 
71 Miramar Hotel & Investment Company Limited 
78 Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited “ 
105 Associated International Hotels Limited 
201 Magnificent Estates Limited ‘ “ 
2 6 6 Tian Teck Land Limited 
2 9 2 Asia Standard Hotel Group Limited 
2 9 3 Cathay Pacific Airways Limited ‘ 
3 0 8 China Travel International Investment HK Limited 
3 5 5 Century City International Holdings Limited 
3 5 7 Hainan Meilan International Airport Company Limited 
5 4 2 Morning Star Resources Limited “ 
557 City e-Solutions Limited 
6 7 0 China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited “ " 
678 Star Cruises Limited 
6 9 4 Beijing Capital International Airport Company Limited “ 
6 9 6 Travel Sky Technology Limited 
7 5 3 Air China Limited 
9 0 8 Jiuzhou Development Company Limited ‘ 
1055 China Southern Airlines Company Limited 
1110 China National Aviation Company Limited 
1189 — Wing On Travel (Holdings) Limited 
1221 Sino Hotels (Holdings) Limited “ 
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Appendix 7: A list of listed firms in the Hong Kong Stock Market which are classified into the 
retailing industry  
Stock Code Company Name  
3 9 Wealthmark International (Holdings) Limited 
4 8 EganaGoldpfeil (Holdings) Limited 
9 8 Winsor Industrial Corporation Limited 
113 Dickson Concepts (International) Limited 
116 Chow Sang Sang Holdings International Limited 
122 Crocodile Garments Limited 
Tak Sing Alliance Holdings Ltd 
130 Moiselle International Holdings Limited 
139 Holdings Limited 
147 Graneagle Holdings Limited 
178 Sa Sa International Holdings Limited 
2 0 8 Polytec Asset Holdings Limited 
2 1 0 Prime Success International Group Limited 
2 2 1 LeRoi Holdings Limited 
2 6 4 Chanco International Group Limited 
2 8 0 King Fook Holdings Limited 
2 8 9 Wing On Company International Limited 
2 9 4 Yangtzekiang Garment Manufacturing Company Limited 
321 Texwinca Holdings Limited 
3 2 8 Alco Holdings Limited 
3 3 0 Esprit Holdings Limited 
3 3 3 Top Form International Limited 
361 Sino Golf Holdings Limited 
3 6 4 Huafeng Textile International Group Limited 
3 8 4 China Gas Holdings Limited 
USI Holdings Limited 
3 9 3 Glorious Sun Enterprises Limited 
4 1 7 Tse Sui Luen Jewellery (International) Limited 
4 2 0 Fountain Set (Holdings) Limited 
4 4 8 Hang Ten Group Holdings Limited 
4 5 8 Instate Holdings Limited 
4 7 6 China Elegance (Holdings) Limited 
5 1 3 Continental Holdings Limited 
5 1 8 Tungtex (Holdings) Company Limited 
5 3 3 Goldlion Holdings Limited 
5 3 9 Victory City International Holdings Limited 
5 6 5 Art Textile Technology International Company Limited 
5 7 8 Everbest Century Holdings Limited  
5 8 9 Ports Design Limited  
5 9 0 Luk Fook Holdings (International) Limited 
5 9 2 Bossini International Holdings Limited 
6 0 0 Pearl Oriental Enterprises Limited 
6 0 8 High Fashion International Limited 
^ U-RIGHT International Holdings Limited 
6 4 3 Carry Wealth Holdings Limited 
^ KTP Holdings Limited 
6 4 7 Joyce Boutique Holdings Limited 
6 5 3 Bonjour Holdings Limited 
6 6 0 Nority International Group Limited 
6 7 6 Pegasus International Holdings Limited 
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stock Code Company Name  
6 8 6 Gay Giano International Group Limited  
Ching Hing (Holdings) Limited | 
7 0 4 Frankie Dominion International Limited  
7 0 9 Giordano International Limited  
7 2 4 Semtech International Holdings Limited  
7 3 8 Le Saunda Holdings Limited  
7 3 9 Zhe Jiang Glass Company Limited I 
7 4 6 Lee & Man Holding Limited 
761 Peking Apparel International Group Limited I 
8 6 0 Ming Fung Jewellery Group Limited  
8 7 0 Hang Fung Gold Technology Limited 
9 0 7 Elegance International Holdings Limited  
9 1 0 Good Fellow Group Limited  
9 1 5 Linmark Group Limited  
9 1 8 Takson Holdings Limited  
9 2 6 Egana Jewellery & Pearls Limited  
9 2 8 Tack Fat Group International Limited  
9 3 3 First Sign International Holdings Limited  
9 3 8 Man Sang International Limited  
9 6 9 Hua Lien International (Holding) Company Limited  
9 8 0 Lianhua Supermarket Holdings Company Limited  
“ 9 8 4 一 AEON Stores (Hong Kong) Company Limited 
9 9 0 Theme International Holdings Limited I 
1 0 0 4 Rising Development Holdings Limited J 
1005 Matrix Holdings Limited | 
1058 Guangdong Tannery Limited  
1 0 9 4 Sunny Global Holdings Limited | 
1100 Mainland Headwear Holdings Limited  
1104 Shanghai Merchants Holdings Limited I 
1130 Benefun International Holdings Limited | 
1131 Kwong Hing International Holdings (Bermuda) Limited I 
1142 Rontex International Holdings Limited  
1161 Water Oasis Group Limited | 
1170 Kingmaker Footwear Holdings Limited | 
1173 Veeko International Holdings Limited  
1179 Mirabell International Holdings Limited  
1 2 1 2 Lifestyle International Holdings Limited 
1218 Easyknit International Holdings Limited 
1223 Symphony Holdings Limited I 
2 3 0 9 Grandtop International Holdings Limited I 
2 3 6 8 Eagle Nice (International) Holdings Limited  
2 6 6 8 Pak Tak International Limited I 
2 6 9 8 Weiqiao Textile Company Limited  
8 0 2 0 Wanasports Holdings Limited I 
8 1 2 6 G.A. Holdings Limited 
8 1 3 6 Fx Creations International Holdings Limited I 
8 1 8 3 Lai Fai International Holdings Limited  
8 2 6 2 A-S China Plumbing Products Limited 
8 2 7 2 Byford International Limited  
8 2 7 7 Wumart Stores Incorporated | 
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Appendix 8: A list of listed firms in the Mainland China stock market which are classified into 
the tourism industry  
Stock Code Company Name  
^ Shenzhen Century Plaza Hotel Company Limited  
69 Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Holding Company  
4 2 8 Hunan Huatian Great Hotel Company Limited  
4 3 0 Zhang Jia Jie Tourism Development Company Limited  
5 2 4 Guangzhou Dong Fang Hotel Company Limited  
6 0 2 Guangdong Golden Horse Tourism Group Stock Company Limited  
6 1 0 Xi'an Tourism (Group) Company Limited  
6 1 3 Hainan Dadonghai Tourism Centre (Holdings) Company Limited  
6 1 6 Dalian Yicheng Group Company Limited  
6 3 9 Hunan Ginde Development Company Limited  
721 Xi'an Catering & Service (Group) Company Limited  
8 0 2 Beijing Jingxi Tourism Development Company Limited  
8 8 8 Emei Shan Tourism Company Limited  
9 7 8 Guilin Tourism Corporation Limited  
6 0 0 0 5 4 Huangshan Tourism Development Company Limited  
6 0 0 1 1 8 China Spacesat Company Limited  
6 0 0 1 3 8 China Cyts Tours Holding Company Limited  
6 0 0 1 7 5 Meidu Holding Company Limited  
6 0 0 5 9 3 Dalian Shengya Ocean World Company Limited  
600650 Shanghai Jin Jiang International Industrial Investment Company Limited  
6 0 0 7 4 9 Tibet Shengdi Company Limited  
6 0 0 7 5 4 Shanghai Jinjiang International Hotels Development Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 7 3 I Tibet Pearl Star Company Limited  
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Appendix 9: A list of listed firms in the Mainland China stock market which are classified into 
the retailing industry  
Stock Code Company Name  
56 Shenzhen International Enterprise Company Limited 
4 1 6 Qingdao Jiante Biological Investment Company Limited 
4 1 7 Hefei Department Store Group Company Limited 
4 1 9 Changsha Tongcheng Holdings Company Limited 
501 Wuhan Department Store Group Company Limited 
5 6 0 Kunming Sinobright(Group) Company Limited 
5 6 4 Xi'an Minsheng Group Company Limited 
5 9 3 Sichuan Baoguang Pharmaceutical Technology Company Limited 
611 The Inner Mongolia Time Technologies Company Limited 
6 6 7 Celebrities Real Estate Development Group Company Limited 
6 6 8 Sinopec Wuhan Petroleum Group Company Limited 
6 7 2 Baiyin Copper Comercial Building (Group) Company Limited 
6 7 9 Dalian Friendship (Group) Company Limited 
7 1 5 Citic Development-Shenyang Commercial Building (Group) Company Limited 
7 3 9 Qingdao Apeloa Company Limited 
7 5 9 Wuhan Zhongbai Group Company Limited 
7 6 5 Wuhan Huaxin Hi-Tech Company Limited 
7 8 5 Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Company Limited 
7 9 6 Baoji Department Store (Group) Company Limited 
8 8 9 Qinhuangdao Bohai Physical Distribution Holding Company Limited 
9 8 7 Guangzhou Friendship Company Limited 
6 0 0 0 8 2 Tianjin Hi-Tech Development Company Limited 
6 0 0 2 8 0 Nanjing Central Emporium Company Limited 
6 0 0 3 0 6 Shen Yang Commercial City Company Limited 
6 0 0 3 2 7 Wuxi Commercial Mansion Corporation Limited 
6 0 0 3 6 1 Beijing Hualian Hypermarket Company Limited 
6 0 0 5 1 5 Hainan First Investment & Merchant Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 1 6 Shanghai First Provisions Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 2 8 Shanghai New World Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 3 1 Shanghai Bailian Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 3 2 Shanghai Hua Li an Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 5 5 Shanghai Yuyuan Tourist Mart Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 8 2 Nanjing Xinjiekou Department Store Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 8 3 Silvertie Holding Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 9 3 Fuji an Dongbai (Group) Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 9 4 Dashang Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 6 9 7 Chang Chun Eurasia Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 1 2 Nanning Department Store Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 2 1 Xin Jiang Bai Hua Cun Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 2 3 Beijing Xidan Market Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 2 9 Chongqing Department Store Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 3 8 Lanzhou Minbai Shareholding (Group) Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 6 6 Yantai Hualian Development Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 7 4 Wuhan Hanshang Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 7 8 Xinjiang Friendship(Group) Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 8 5 Yinchuan Xinhua Department Store Company Limited 
6 0 0 7 9 1 Tianchuang Property Company Limited 
6 0 0 8 0 7 Shandong Jinan Department Store(Group) Company Limited 
6 0 0 8 1 4 Hangzhou Jiebai Group Company Limited 
6 0 0 8 2 1 Tianjin Quanye Bazaar (Group) Company Limited 
76 
stock Code Company Name  
6 0 0 8 2 3 Shanghai Shimiao Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 2 4 Shanghai Yimin Department Stores Company Ltd.  
6 0 0 8 2 5 Hualian Supermarket Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 2 7 Shanghai Friendship Group Incorporated Company  
6 0 0 8 3 0 Ningbo Dahongying Industry & Investment Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 3 8 Shanghai Join Buy Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 4 0 Zhejiang Xinhu Venture Investment Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 5 6 Changchun Department Jituan Store Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 5 7 Hit Shouchuang Technology Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 5 9 Beijing Wangfujing Department Store (Group) Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 6 1 Beijing Urban-Rural Trade Centre Company Limited  
6 0 0 8 6 5 Baida Group Company Limited  
I 600891 Harbin Churin Group Jointstock Company Limited 
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Appendix 10: Weekly Abnormal Returns (WAR) and Cumulative Weekly Abnormal Returns 
(CWAR) of Retailing Industry in the Hong Kong Stock Market during the SARS period 
Weekly Cumulative Event Week Weekly Abnormal Returns a i , J ^ Abnormal Returns 
1 -0 .0042 -0 .0042 
2 0 .0012 -0 .0029 
3 -0 .0187 -0 .0216 
4 0 .0161 -0 .0055 
5 0 .0061 0 .0006 
6 0 .0119 0 .0125 
7 -0 .0140 -0 .0015 
8 0 .0008 -0 .0007 
9 -0 .0075 -0 .0081 
10 0 .0030 -0 .0051 
11 -0 .0012 -0 .0063 
12 0 .0321 0 .0258 
13 -0 .0137 0 .0121 
14 0 . 0 6 9 2 0 .0812 
15 0 .0108 0 .0921 
16 - 0 . 0 3 5 4 0 .0566 
17 0 .0062 0 .0628 
18 -0 .0101 0 .0527 
19 -0 .0076 0 .0451 
2 0 -0 .0317 0 .0134 
21 -0 .0197 -0 .0063 
2 2 - 0 . 0 1 1 2 -0 .0175 
23 -0 .0377 -0 .0552 
2 4 0 .0905 0 .0354 
2 5 -0 .0037 0 .0316 
2 6 0 .0186 0 .0502 
2 7 0 . 0 1 5 4 0 .0657 
28 - 0 . 0 0 5 0 0 .0607 
2 9 0 . 0 0 9 4 0 .0701 
30 -0 .0066 0 .0635 
31 -0 .0117 0 .0518 
n 0 .0051 0 .0569 
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Appendix 11: Weekly Abnormal Returns (WAR) and Cumulative Weekly Abnormal Returns 
(CWAR) of Tourism Industry in the Hong Kong Stock Market during the SARS period 
Weekly Cumulative 
Event Week Weekly Abnormal Returns ” , n . Abnormal Returns 
1 -0.0256 -0.0256 
2 0.0170 -0.0086 
3 0.0508 0.0422 
4 0.0164 0.0586 
5 -0.0398 0.0188 
6 0.0067 0.0255 
7 -0.0023 0.0232 
8 0.0342 0.0574 
9 0.0109 0.0682 
10 0.0194 0.0876 
11 0.0168 0.1044 
12 -0.0089 0.0955 
13 0.0070 0.1026 
14 -0.0044 0.0981 
15 -0.0217 0.0764 
16 -0.0009 0.0755 
17 0.0034 0.0790 
18 -0.0008 0.0781 
19 -0.0569 0.0212 
20 -0.0233 -0.0021 
21 -0.0484 -0.0505 
22 -0.0199 -0.0704 
23 -0.0327 -0.1031 
24 0.0806 -0.0225 
25 -0.0124 -0.0349 
26 -0.0035 -0.0384 
27 0.0148 -0.0236 
28 0.0183 -0.0053 
29 0.0209 0.0156 
30 0.0237 0.0393 
31 -0.0161 0.0232 
^ 0.0058 0.0290 
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Appendix 12: Weekly Abnormal Returns (WAR) and Cumulative Weekly Abnormal Returns 
(CWAR) of Retailing Industry in the Mainland China stock market during the whole SARS 
period  
W Cumulative Event Week ., � 2 “ Weekly Abnormal Returns a i i n [ Abnormal Returns 
i -0.0061 -0.0061 
2 0.0010 -0.0052 
3 -0.0027 -0.0078 
4 -0.0004 -0.0082 
5 -0.0023 -0.0106 
6 -0.0054 -0.0160 
7 0.0031 -0.0129 
8 -0.0057 -0.0186 
9 -0.0168 -0.0354 
10 0.0045 -0.0309 
11 -0.0064 -0.0373 
12 -0.0017 -0.0390 
13 0.0035 -0.0355 
14 -0.0085 -0.0440 
15 -0.0026 -0.0466 
16 -0.0049 -0.0515 
17 -0.0099 -0.0614 
18 -0.0064 -0.0678 
19 -0.0115 -0.0793 
20 -0.0341 -0.1134 
21 0.0063 -0.1072 
22 0.0214 -0.0857 
23 -0.0253 -0.1110 
24 -0.0279 -0.1389 
25 -0.0056 -0.1445 
26 0.0083 -0.1361 
27 0.0063 -0.1298 
28 0.0062 -0.1236 
29 0.0067 -0.1169 
^ -0.0065 -0.1234 
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Appendix 13: Weekly Abnormal Returns (WAR) and Cumulative Weekly Abnormal Returns 
(CWAR) of Tourism Industry in the Mainland China stock market during the SARS period 
Weekly Cumulative 
Event Week “ Weekly Abnormal Returns ., , „ ^ Abnormal Returns 
1 0.0064 0.0064 
2 -0.0051 0.0013 
3 0.0044 0.0057 
4 0.0036 0.0093 
5 -0.0101 -0.0008 
6 -0.0007 -0.0016 
7 -0.0066 -0.0082 
8 -0.0032 -0.0114 
9 -0.0138 -0.0252 
10 -0.0034 -0.0286 
11 0.0066 -0.0220 
12 0.0142 -0.0078 
13 -0.0100 -0.0178 
14 0.0040 -0.0138 
15 0.0025 -0.0113 
16 -0.0018 -0.0131 
17 -0.0067 -0.0198 
18 -0.0083 -0.0281 
19 -0.0088 -0.0369 
20 -0.0325 -0.0694 
21 0.0093 -0.0601 
22 -0.0385 ‘ -0.0986 
23 -0.0254 -0.1240 
24 -0.0036 -0.1275 
25 -0.0045 -0.1321 
26 0.0104 -0.1216 
27 0.0193 -0.1023 
28 -0.0028 -0.1052 
29 0.0138 -0.0914 
^ -0.0074 -0.0988 
81 
Appendix 14: Daily and Cumulative Market Returns of the Mainland China stock market 
around the Information Chaotic Period  
Trading Market Cumulative 
date y returns Market Returns 
March 14，2003 77 0.0018 0.0018 
March 17,2003 78 -0.0006 0.0013 
March 18,2003 79 -0.0067 -0.0054 
March 19,2003 80 0.0035 -0.0019 
March 20,2003 81 -0.0037 -0.0057 
March 21,2003 82 0.0090 0.0034 
March 24,2003 83 0.0014 0.0048 
March 25,2003 84 -0.0110 -0.0062 
March 26,2003 85 -0.0052 -0.0114 
March 27,2003 86 0.0263 0.0149 
March 28,2003 87 -0.0037 0.0111 
March 31,2003 88 0.0109 0.0220 
April 1,2003 89 0.0066 0.0286 
April 2,2003 90 -0.0012 0.0275 
April 3,2003 91 -0.0042 0.0233 
April 4,2003 92 0.0059 0.0292 
April 7,2003 93 -0.0078 0.0214 
April 8,2003 94 -0.0019 0.0195 
April 9,2003 95 0.0111 0.0306 
April 10,2003 96 0.0063 0.0369 
April 11,2003 97 0.0144 0.0513 
April 14,2003 98 0.0254 0.0767 
April 15,2003 99 0.0111 0.0878 
April 16,2003 100 -0.0140 0.0738 
April 17,2003 101 0.0050 0.0789 
April 18,2003 102 -0.0030 0.0759 
April 21,2003 103 -0.0181 0.0577 
April 22,2003 104 -0.0009 0.0568 
April 23,2003 105 -0.0150 0.0418 
April 24,2003 106 -0.0259 0.0159 
April 25,2003 107 -0.0124 0.0035 
April 28,2003 108 0.0268 0.0303 
April 29,2003 109 -0.0191 0.0113 
April 30’ 2003 HO 0.0022 0.0135 
82 
Appendix 15: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of Retailing Industry in Mainland China 
during the Information Chaotic Period  
Trading Industrial Cumulative 
dale day returns Industrial Returns 
March 14,2003 77 -0.0021 -� .05 :? 
March 17,2003 78 -0.0045 
March 18,2003 79 0.0016 -0.05= 
March 19,2003 80 -0.0040 -0.0585 
March 20,2003 81 -0.0005 -0.0591 
March 21,2003 82 -0.0009 -0.0599 
March 24,2003 83 -0.0004 -0.0603 
March 25,2003 84 0.0000 -0.0603 
March 26,2003 85 0.0001 -0.0602 
March 27,2003 86 -0.0032 -0.0634 
March 28,2003 87 -0.0018 -0.0652 
March 31,2003 88 -0.0057 -0.0709 
April 1,2003 89 0.0013 -0.0695 
April 2,2003 90 -0.0010 -0.0705 
April 3,2003 91 0.0005 -0.0700 
April 4，2003 92 -0.0049 -0.0749 
April 7,2003 93 -0.0076 -0.0825 
April 8,2003 94 -0.0066 -0.0891 
April 9,2003 95 -0.0091 -0.0982 
April 10,2003 96 -0.0039 -0.1021 
April 11,2003 97 -0.0078 -0.1098 
April 14,2003 98 0.0100 -0.0998 
April 15,2003 99 -0.0070 -0.1069 
April 16,2003 100 -0.0096 -0.1165 
April 17，2003 101 0.0048 -0.1117 
April 18,2003 102 0.0111 -0.1007 
April 21,2003 103 0.0078 -0.0929 
April 22,2003 104 -0.0077 -0.1006 
April 23,2003 105 -0.0018 -0.1024 
April 24，2003 106 0.0103 -0.0921 
April 25,2003 107 0.0124 -0.0798 
April 28,2003 108 -0.0147 -0.0944 
April 29,2003 109 -0.0056 -0.1000 
April 30，2003 HO -0.0060 -0.1061 
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Appendix 16: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of Tourism Industry in Mainland China 
during the Information Chaotic Period  
Trading , Industrial Cumulative 
date returns Industrial Returns 
March 14,2003 77 -0.0013 0.0176 
March 17,2003 78 -0.0023 0.0153 
March 18,2003 79 -0.0028 0.0125 
March 19,2003 80 -0.0038 0.0088 
March 20,2003 81 0.0018 0.0106 
March 21,2003 82 0.0011 0.0117 
March 24,2003 83 0.0040 0.0156 
March 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 84 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 .0171 
March 26,2003 85 0.0038 0.0208 
March 27,2003 86 -0.0061 0.0147 
March 28,2003 87 -0.0009 0.0138 
March 31,2003 88 -0.0056 0.0083 
April 1,2003 89 -0.0028 0.0055 
April 2,2003 90 -0.0041 0.0013 
April 3,2003 91 0.0040 0.0054 
April 4,2003 92 -0.0008 0.0045 
April 7,2003 93 -0.0093 -0.0047 
April 8,2003 94 -0.0044 -0.0091 
April 9,2003 95 -0.0125 -0.0216 
April 10，2003 96 -0.0009 -0.0225 
April 11,2003 97 -0.0023 -0.0247 
April 14,2003 98 -0.0095 -0.0342 
April 15,2003 99 0.0049 -0.0292 
April 16，2003 100 0.0112 -0.0181 
April 17，2003 101 -0.0051 -0.0231 
April 18,2003 102 0.0130 -0.0102 
April 21,2003 103 -0.0161 -0.0263 
April 22,2003 104 -0.0064 -0.0327 
April 23,2003 105 0.0038 -0.0289 
April 24,2003 106 -0.0052 -0.0342 
April 25,2003 107 -0.0104 -0.0445 
April 28,2003 108 -0.0301 -0.0746 
April 29,2003 109 0.0039 -0.0707 
April 30’ 2003 HO 0.0043 -0.0664 
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Appendix 17: Summary of SARS information from day 93 to day 100 
Trading Date Day Governmental SARS Information Non-govemmental SARS information 
April 7, 93 - Chinese government claimed that - Side-street news was widespread among 
2003 containing SARS became the citizens in Beijing. The news mentioned 
major task of the government and that many hospitals had received SARS 
believed that they had the ability patients and some of them even did not 
to contain the disease. have any vacancy left for new patients. 
Journalist interviews were prohibited.  
April 8， 94 - Ministry of Health announced the - The WHO criticized the SARS reporting 
2003 SARS situation in Beijing and system in Mainland China. SARS patients 
claimed that SARS was under in military hospitals were not counted, 
control. - Reports about the hard work made by 
medical workers in curing SARS patients 
were widespread. Many people believed 
the official figures were understated.  
April 9， 95 - A letter written by Doctor Jiang Yanyong 
2003 was published in the Time Magazine. The 
letter disclosed that SARS situation in 
Beijing was much understated by the 
Minister of Health.  
April 10, 96 - A representative of the Ministry of 
2003 Health claimed that the announced 
official figures had included 
patients in all hospitals, including 
those in the military hospitals. He 
highly emphasized that the official 
Figures were reliable.  
April 11, 97 - The WHO experts went to Mainland China 
2003 to investigate the SARS reporting system 
in Beijing. 
- T h e WHO announced that SARS situation 
in Guangdong was under control  
April 14， 98 - Chinese government asked travel 
2003 agencies to stop all tourist trips to 
Southeast Asia.  
April 15， 99 -Time Magazine reported that military 
2003 hospitals had removed SARS patients from 
the hospitals during the investigation by 
the WHO experts.  
April 16， 100 - T h e WHO adjusted their trust to the 
2003 Chinese government and believed that the 
official figures of the epidemic were at 
least understated by five times.  
Source: (a) "SARS: Chronology of a serial killer", the WHO. 
(http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 04/en/index.htmn 
(b) "Chronology of SARS", Nanfang Daily 
("http ://www. nanfan gdailv.com.cn) 
(c) "SARSdashiji", the Peking University 
('http://www.pkusimba.com/sars/dsi.html 
(d) South China Morning Post 
(http ://www. scmp.com) 
8 5 
References 
Ball, R.’ Brown, P., 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. 
Journal of Accounting Research 6(2), 159-78. 
Beaver, W., 1981. Econometric Properties of Alternative Security Return Methods. 
Journal of Accounting Research 19(1), 163-84. 
Benson, C•’ Clay, E.J., 2004. Understanding the economic and financial impacts of 
natural disasters. World Bank. http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC 17210.htm 
Dolley, J., 1933. Characteristics and Procedure of Common Stock Split-ups. Harvard 
Business Review 11, 316-26. 
Fama, E.’ Fisher, L.’ Jensen, M.，Roll, R.，1969. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New 
Information. International Economic Review 10(1), 1-21. 
Fan, E., 2003. SARS: Economic Impacts and Implications. ERD Policy Brief Series No. 
15，Asian Development Bank. 
Jakes, S.’ Beijing's SARS Attack. April 8，2003. http:"www.time• com/time/asia/news/ 
dailv/0.9754.4416is,00htm1 
Kester, J., 2004. WTO World Tourism Barometer and Preliminary Results for 
International Tourism in 2003. Tourism Economics 10(1)，101-19. 
Koo, J., Fu, D.，2003. The Effects of SARS on East Asian Economies. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, Expand Your Insight, July 1. 
Kunreuther, H.，Rose, A., 2004. The Economics of Natural Hazards. 2 vols. Elgar 
Reference Collection. International Li-brary of Critical Writings in Economics, vol.178. 
Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2004; xxxv, 483; xi, 489. 
Lee, J., McKibbin, W., 2003. Globalization and Disease: The case of SARS. Australian 
National University, Economic RSPAS, Trade and Development 2003. 
Liu, J., Hammit, J.，Wang, J., Tsou, M.，2005. Valuation of the Risk of SARS in Taiwan. 
Health Economics 14(1), 83-91. 
MacKinlay, A., 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature 35(1), 13-39. 
86 
Min, J., 2005. SARS Devastation on Tourism: The Taiwan Case. Journal of American 
Academy of Business, Cambridge 6(1)，278-284. 
Nippani, S.，Washer, K., 2004. SARS: A Non-event for Affected Countries' Stock 
Markets? Applied Financial Economics 14(15), 1105-10. 
Skrepnek, G..’ Lawson, K.，2001. Measuring Changes in Capital Market Security Prices: 
The Event Study Methodology. Journal of Research in Pharmaceutical Economics 11(1), 
1-17. 
Siu, A., Wong, R., 2003. Ravaged by SARS: The Case of Hong Kong SARS. Paper 
presented at Asian Economic Panel, Keio University, Tokyo. 
Strong, N., 1992. Modeling Abnormal Returns: a review article. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting 19, 533-53. 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2003. Impacts of SARS on Chinese Economy. 
http://www.tdctrade.eom/alert/cba-e0306sp-4.htm 
World Health Organization. Chronology of travel recommendations, areas with local 
transmission, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 07 Ol/en/index.html 
World Health Organization. Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS. 
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/countrv/2003 07 11/en/ 
World Health Organization. Preliminary Clinical Description of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/clinical/en/ 
World Health Organization. SARS: Chronology of a serial killer, http:"www.who.int/csr/  
don/2003 07 04/en/index.html 
Wu, Q., 2003. Empirical Study on Impact of SARS Epidemic on The Equity Funds in 
China. Management Review 15(5), 8-11. 
Yu, T. S.，Financial Crisis in East Asia, http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/ 
etextbook/ 4534/4534 1 4.pdf 
Zhang, Y.’ Liu, Y., Xu, S.，Wang, S.，2003. Event-study Analysis of SARS's Impact on 
Chinese Stock Market. Management Review 15(5), 3-7. 
8 7 
. ‘ 
. . . . .-I ‘ . 
, ‘ .‘ ” 
- • . ‘ . • • 
•‘ ； ‘ . ‘ .. > 
I CUHK Libraries 
004278991 
